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WEAK CARTELS AND COLLUSION-PROOF AUCTIONS
YEON-KOO CHE, DANIELE CONDORELLI, AND JINWOO KIM
Abstract. We study collusion in a large class of private-value auctions by cartels whose
members cannot exchange monetary transfers among themselves (i.e., weak cartels). We
provide a complete characterization of outcomes that are implementable in the presence
of weak cartels, and identify optimal collusion-proof auctions for symmetric value distri-
butions. When the density is single-peaked, the optimal collusion-proof auction can be
implemented by a procedure that combines a second-price auction with a sequential one-
on-one negotiation.




Collusion is a pervasive problem in auctions, especially in public procurement. In 2009
the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) fined 103 construction firms which had been found
colluding on 199 tenders between 2006 and 2009. The cartel affected construction projects
worth more than 200 million pounds and including schools, universities, hospitals, and
various private projects. The Dutch Construction cartel, whose revelation became a TV
documentary as well as one of the biggest financial scandals in the Netherlands, allegedly
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involved 3,500 rigged bids during 1986-1998.1 In Korea, the competition authority uncov-
ered in 2007 a cartel in the construction of Subway Line 7 in Seoul. In this case, the largest
six local companies won six different sections of the subway line construction.
The vast majority of the bid-rigging cases uncovered by competition authorities fall into
the category of what McAfee and McMillan (1992) labeled weak cartels, namely cartels that
do not involve exchange of side payments among cartel members. Weak cartels usually
operate by designating a winning bidder and suppressing competition from other cartel
members. The winning bidder is designated through “market sharing” agreements (e.g.,
Korea), through “bid rotation” whereby firms took turns in winning contracts (e.g., some
UK cartels), or through more complicated schemes (e.g., in the Dutch case). The designated
bidders place bids somewhere around the reserve price, and bids from other cartel members
are either altogether suppressed (the practice of “bid suppression”) or submitted at non-
competitive levels (the practice of “cover bidding”).
Cartels have good reasons to avoid side payments: monetary transfers leave a trail of
evidence that can expose a cartel and lead to its prosecution. Compensating losing bidders
in money may also lure “pretenders” who join a cartel solely to collect “the loser compen-
sation” without ever intending to win. At the same time, it is not clear how cartel may
successfully operate without exchanging side-payments among its members. If transfers
are not used, compensating losing bidders entails an efficiency loss and a cartel may not
work. Hence, despite the abundant empirical evidence of weak cartels, it remains unclear
how weak cartels operate. We thus ask the following questions: Can weak cartels form and
operate effectively? If so, under what circumstances and what auction formats? What are
their effects? How should auctions be designed to deter weak cartels?
McAfee and McMillan (1992, henceforth MM) were the first to show that weak cartels can
operate successfully, even with extreme allocative inefficiencies. They showed that in a first-
price auction, symmetric bidders would benefit ex-ante from agreeing to randomly select a
single bidder to bid the reserve price (as opposed to playing the symmetric equilibrium of
the auction) whenever their value distribution has the increasing hazard rate. Further, they
suggest that the optimal response by the seller is to sell the good at a fixed price. To the
1In 2001, a TV program, Zembla, made an investigative report on fraud inquiries in Netherlands. See
Doree (2004).
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extent that the increasing hazard rate is a mild condition, this theory suggests that a first-
price auction is “virtually always” susceptible to a weak cartel, and that in its presence the
seller can never hope to realize the efficiency gain from bidding competition. This largely
negative view rests on the analysis of ex ante benefit from collusion, however. Importantly,
their model does not consider bidders’ (interim) incentives to participate in a cartel. Even
though a cartel promises to yield strictly positive surplus to its members on average, the
surplus may not accrue to all bidder types so that bidders may actually be worse off from
participating in the cartel, depending on the realization of their types. In practice, the
lack of interest alignment is often what causes a cartel — even well-known ones such as
OPEC — to break up, so the analysis would be incomplete and potentially misleading
without considering the potential conflicts of interest among cartel participants. This issue
is particularly relevant for a weak cartel since the gains from a cartel manipulation cannot
be redistributed via side transfers.
In the current paper, we explicitly consider the bidders’ interim incentive to participate
in a cartel. Doing so yields a qualitatively different result on weak cartel manipulation. In
particular, our characterization of weak cartel susceptibility depends crucially on the shape
of bidders’ type distribution. We show that a large class of standard auctions — which we
call “winner-payable” (to be explained later) — is susceptible to a weak cartel if and only
if the auction allocates the good to a bidder with non-constant probability over an interval
of types where the density of value distribution is non-decreasing (Theorem 1 and 2). This
means in particular that an auction (in the winner-payable class) that allocates the good
efficiently is vulnerable to cartel manipulation unless all bidders’ distributions are concave.
In the latter case (i.e., if the density of value distribution is always decreasing), however,
a weak cartel can never be effective; in particular the seller can implement the Myerson’s
second-best outcome even in the presences of a weak cartel.
The intuition behind our result is explained as follows. Since members of a weak cartel
can never use side payments, they can only gain from altering the allocation of the good,
specifically by selecting a winner at random — i.e., by letting a randomly-selected bidder
win with a low bid, with the other bidders either staying out or making non-competitive
losing bids. Such a manipulation entails efficiency loss (as compared with the competitive
outcome), and this loss is not borne uniformly across different types. As will be shown
in our analysis, the bidder with the highest valuation is affected most adversely by this
efficiency loss, and the efficiency loss is larger the more likely it is for his opponents to
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have low valuations. The distribution of bidders’ valuations thus matters: if the density
of bidder valuation is increasing, the efficiency loss from random allocation is lessened
from the perspective of the high value bidder, so the overall gain from a low winning
bid dominates the efficiency loss even for such a bidder. The cartel manipulation is thus
profitable uniformly across all types. If the density of bidder’s valuation is decreasing,
however, the opposite is true, and the highest type bidder will start defecting, followed by
the types just below, which makes the cartel unravel.
The complete characterization of collusion-proof auctions obtained in Theorem 1 and 2
enables us to study the normative question: How should one design an auction in the
presence of a weak cartel? Restricting attention to winner-payable auctions, we identify
the optimal collusion-proof auction for the seller when the bidder’s valuation is drawn
from identical distribution whose density has a single-peak (Theorem 3). In such a case,
the optimal collusion-proof mechanism combines features of the Myerson’s optimal auction
and sequential one-on-one negotiation (Corollary 5). The seller begins with a second-price
auction with a reserve price set at the maximum between the standard optimal reserve price
and the peak of the density. If no bidder bids above that reserve price (so the auction yields
no sale), then the seller engages in a take-it-or-leave-it negotiation with each of the bidders
sequentially in a predetermined order. This mechanism collapses to two special forms in the
case the density is everywhere decreasing and in the case it is everywhere nondecreasing.
In the former case, the Myerson auction is collusion-proof and thus optimal. In the latter
case, the optimal collusion-proof mechanism reduces to sequential negotiation.
This result stands in contrast to the MM’s theory that the seller can do no better
than posting a single price in the presence of a weak cartel. It is also interesting that the
sequential negotiation treats bidders asymmetrically even though they are ex ante identical.
The reason for this surprising result is that since the seller cannot discriminate across types
of a given bidder (due to the collusion proofness requirement), she finds it optimal to
discriminate across bidders.
Considering a bidder’s incentive to participate in collusion involves a conceptual issue.
A bidder’s incentive to join a cartel depends on the payoff he expects to receive if he
refuses to join the cartel, and that payoff in turn depends on what happens when a bidder
refuses to join a cartel. In particular, how the remaining bidders update their beliefs about
the refusing bidder, whether they will still form a cartel among themselves, and, if so, to
WEAL CARTELS 5
what extent they can credibly punish the refusing bidder, all affect that payoff. In dealing
with these issues, we initially follow the weak collusion-proofness notion of Laffont and
Martimort (1997, 2000) by assuming that when a bidder refuses to participate in a cartel,
the cartel collapses and the remaining bidders do not update their beliefs.
In section 5, we consider a much broader set of circumstances in terms of how a cartel
is formed and operated. For instance, any informed bidder(s) as well as an uninformed
mediator may propose a cartel manipulation; there can be partial or multiple cartels in
operation; and participants in a cartel may punish those who have refused to participate.
We show that outcomes that are weakly collusion-proof can be also implemented by the
auctioneer in these environments, as long as no cartel employs strategies that are weakly
dominated for themselves (Theorem 5).
The current paper is related to a number of papers on collusion in auction. Seminal con-
tributions include Robinson (1985), Graham and Marshall (1987), von Ungern-Stenberg
(1988), Mailath and Zemsky (1991), and MM, who studied whether a collusive agreement
can be beneficial to its members.2 Unlike the current paper, these papers largely focus
on strong cartels, where side-payments play a crucial role for achieving efficient collusion.
As mentioned above, MM does consider weak cartels and show that they involve random
allocation of a good, much consistent with oft-observed practice of bid rotation.3 As high-
lighted above, our approach is differentiated by its explicit consideration of the bidders’
incentive for participation in the cartel. This difference explains the different results we
2These authors, like us, abstract from the enforcement issue — how members of a cartel may sustain
collusion without a legally binding contract. Several authors study enforceability of collusion through
repeated interaction (see Aoyagi (2003), Athey et al. (2004), Blume and Heidhues (2004), and Skrzypacz
and Hopenhayn (2004)) or via implicit collusive strategies (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (2005),
Brusco and Lopomo (2002), Marshall and Marx (2007, 2009), Garratt et al. (2009)). If types are distributed
independently over time, repeated interaction enables members of a weak cartel to use their future market
shares in a way similar to monetary transfers. If the types are persistent over time, as we envision to be
more realistic, however, tampering with future market shares involves severe efficiency loss (see Athey and
Bagwell (2008)). The current modeling approach is justified as long as market share cannot be adjusted
frictionlessly without welfare consequences.
3See also Condorelli (2012). This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of a single object to a number of
agents when payments made to the designer are socially wasteful and cannot be redistributed. The problem
addressed is analogous to that of a cartel-mediator designing an ex-ante optimal weak cartel agreement at
a standard auction with no reserve price.
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obtain on the susceptibility of auctions to a weak cartel and the optimal response by the
seller in its presence.
Aside from the participation incentive, our model is also more general than MM in
several respects. First, we consider a more general class of auctions called “winner-payable
auctions.” These are the auctions in which bidders can coordinate, if they so choose,
so that only one bidder can pay to win the object. Winner-payable auctions include all
standard auctions such as first-price sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid, Dutch and English
auctions, or any hybrid forms, and sequential negotiation. Considering such a general class
of auctions helps to isolate the features of auctions that make them vulnerable to cartels.
Second, we relax the monotone hazard rate and symmetry assumptions. One may view
bidder symmetry as favoring the emergence of a cartel especially when the use of side
payments is limited. In practice, however, bidders are unlikely to be symmetric, so it is
useful to know to what extent bidder asymmetry affects the sustainability of weak cartels.
The current paper is also related to the literature that studies collusion-proof mechanism
design. This literature, pioneered by Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) (henceforth LM)
and further generalized by Che and Kim (2006, 2009) (henceforth CK), models cartel as
designing an optimal mechanism for its members (given the underlying auction mechanism
they face), assuming that the members have necessary wherewithal to enforce whatever
agreement they make.4 Similar to LM (1997, 2000) and CK (2006), we explicitly consider
the bidders’ incentives for participating the cartel. Unlike the current paper, though,
their models allow a cartel to be formed only after bidders enter into the grand auction
noncooperatively. This modeling assumption, while realistic in some internal organization
setting, is not applicable to auction environments where the collusion often centers around
the participation into auction.
CK (2009) and Pavlov (2008) do consider collusion on participation. And they show
that the second-best outcome (i.e., the Myerson (1981) benchmark) can be achieved even
in the presence of a strong cartel as long as the second best involves a sufficient amount
of exclusion of bidders. The mechanism that accomplishes this has features not shared by
the standard auctions, however. For instance, it requires losing bidders not only to pay the
winning bidders but also to incur strict loss in some states, i.e., it fails ex-post individual
4The likely scenario of enforcement involves the threat of retaliation through future interaction, multi-
market contact, or organized crime.
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rationality of the bidders. Such auctions, while theoretically interesting, are never observed
in practice. By contrast, the current paper restricts attention to a more realistic, albeit
broad, class of auctions rules, particularly those that ensure ex-post individual rationality.
Further, the results we obtain here are more in line with the casual empiricism, namely
that even weak cartels can present a serious problem for auctions. These two approaches
ultimately complement each other in the sense that they clarify the features of auctions
that make them vulnerable to bidder collusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a broad class of auction
rules and the model of collusion. Section 3 characterizes the condition for the auction rules
to be susceptible to weak cartel. Section 4 characterizes the optimal weak cartel collusion-
proof auctions. Section 5 presents a more robust concept of collusion-proofness. Appendices
A, B, and C (together with Supplementary Appendix) contain all the proofs not presented
in the main body of the paper.
2. Model
2.1. Environment. A risk neutral seller has a single object for sale. The seller’s valuation
of the object is normalized at zero. There are n ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders and N := {1, ..., n}
denotes the set of bidders. We assume that bidder i’s private valuation of the object,
vi, is drawn from the interval Vi := [vi, vi] ⊂ R+ according to a strictly increasing and
continuous cumulative distribution function Fi (with density fi). We let V := ×i∈NVi and
assume that bidders’ valuations are independently distributed. When a bidder does not
obtain the object, makes no payment, and receives no transfer, he earns a reservation utility
normalized to zero.
The object is sold via an auction (i.e. a selling mechanism). An auction is defined by
a triplet, A := (B, ξ, τ), where B := ×i∈NBi is a profile of message spaces (one for each
bidder), ξ : B → Q is a rule mapping a vector of messages (typically the “bids”) to a
(possibly random) allocation of the object in Q := {(x1, ..., xn) ∈ [0, 1]n|
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1}, and
τ : B → Rn is a rule determining expected payments as a function of the messages. We
assume that the seller cannot force bidders to participate in the auction. Therefore, for each
bidder, we require that the message space Bi includes a non-participation option, b0i , the
exercise of which results in no winning and no payment for bidder i, ξi(b
0
i , ·) = τi(b0i , ·) = 0.
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Whether and how a cartel can operate in an auction depends crucially on the fine details
of its allocation and payment rule. CK (2009) show that if the seller faces no constraints in
designing the auction, any outcome that involves sufficient exclusion can be implemented
even in the presence of a cartel that can use side payment and reallocate objects among
its members. By effectively “selling the project” to the cartel at a fixed price, the seller
removes any scope for a manipulation of the bids by the cartel. However, optimal auction
of this type may require payments from losing bidders and therefore is rarely observed in
practice.
Standard auctions do not often collect payments from losing bidders, so they are poten-
tially susceptible to bidder collusion in a way not recognized by CK (2009). In the current
paper, we focus on these more realistic auction formats. Specifically, we restrict attention
to a set A∗ of auction rules that are winner-payable in the following sense.
Definition 1. An auction A is winner-payable if, for all i ∈ N , there exist message
vectors bi, b




≤ τi(bi) for all b ∈ B such that ξi(b) > 0 and τi(b)
ξi(b)
≤ vi.
In words, an auction is winner-payable if, for each bidder i, there exist two profiles of
bids, bi and bi, which both result in all bidders except for bidder i paying nothing and bidder
i winning the object for sure, at a lowest per-unit price for the object (in the former) and
at a highest per-unit price (in the latter) allowed by the auction rule, respectively. One
can see that most of commonly observed auctions are winner-payable.5
• First-Price (or Dutch) Auctions with Reserve Price: winner-payability holds
because each bidder can obtain the object for sure at any positive price above the
reserve price, if he places a bid at that price and all the other bidders place lower
bids or do not participate in the auction.
5Lotteries represent a notable exception. For instance, consider a mechanism where there is a fixed
number of lottery tickets, each bidder can buy a single ticket at a fixed price, the auctioneer retains the
unsold tickets, and the object is assigned to the holder of a randomly selected ticket. In this mechanism
Bi := {0, 1}, ξi(0, b−i) = τi(0, b−i) = 0, ξi(1, b−i) = 1/n, τi(1, b−i) = p for some p ∈ R. Winner-payability
fails as there is no message profile that can guarantee the object to any of the players. On the other hand,
fixed-prize raffles (see Morgan (2000)) are winner-payable.
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• Second-Price (or English) Auctions with Reserve Price: winner-payability
holds because each bidder i can be guaranteed to win the good at any price above
the reserve price, if another bidder bids exactly that price, i bids anything above
that price, and all other bidders bid strictly lower or do not participate.
• Sequential Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Suppose the seller approaches the buy-
ers in a given exogenous order and makes to each of them a single take-or-leave-it
offer. This format is winner-payable because each bidder can win the object for
sure if all other prior bidders reject their offers.6
More generally, winner-payability is implied by the requirement that only the winner
of the auction pays for the object, if the auction is deterministic (i.e. for each profile of
bids the object is assigned with probability one to only one of the bidders, whenever it is
assigned), or randomization is limited to tie-breaking and it occurs with zero probability
in (collusion-free) equilibrium.
2.2. Characterization of Collusion-Free Outcomes. An auction rule A in A∗ induces
a game of incomplete information where all bidders simultaneously submit messages (i.e.
bids) to the seller. A pure strategy for player i is βi : Vi → Bi, and β = (β1, · · · , βn)
denotes its profile.
Given a profile of equilibrium bidding strategies β∗ of an auction, its outcome cor-
responds to a direct mechanism MA ≡ (q, t) : V → Q × Rn, where for all v ∈ V ,
q(v) = ξ(β∗(v)) is the allocation rule for the object and t(v) = τ(β∗(v)) is the payment
rule. Given MA, we define the interim winning probability Qi(vi) = Ev−i [qi(vi, v−i)] and
interim payment Ti(vi) = Ev−i [ti(vi, v−i)] for bidder i ∈ N with type vi ∈ Vi. We will refer
to the mapping Q = (Qi)i∈N and T = (Ti)i∈N as interim allocation and transfer rules,
6More precisely, suppose the seller approaches the buyers in the order of the bidder index, say, and
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of pi for bidder i in his turn (i.e., when all bidders before i have rejected
the seller’s offers). A bid profile b = (b1, ..., bn) in this rule may represent the highest offers bidders are
willing to accept. Given this interpretation, ξi(b) represents the probability of the event that bidder i is
approached by the seller and accepts her offer of pi, so ξi(b) > 0 means that bi > pi. Further, conditional
on that event, bidder i pays pi, so τi(b)/ξi(b) = pi whenever ξi(b) > 0. In this case, b
i = b
i
can be set so
that for j 6= i, bij = b
i




i = bi (i.e, the same
as the original bid for bidder i). Then, ξi(b
i) = ξ(b
i
) = 1, and τ(bi) = τ(b
i
) = pi = τi(b)/ξi(b).
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respectively. The equilibrium payoff of player i with value vi is then expressed as
UMAi (vi) := Qi(vi)vi − Ti(vi).
Any equilibrium outcome MA must be incentive compatible (by definition of equi-
librium) and individually rational (because bidders are offered the non-participation
option). That is, for all i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi:
(IC) UMAi (vi) ≥ viQi(v˜i)− Ti(v˜i), for all v˜i ∈ Vi,
(IR) UMAi (vi) ≥ 0
In the following Lemma, we characterize the set of interim allocation and transfer rules
that can arise as an equilibrium outcome of some auction rule.
Lemma 1. A profile (Q, T ) is the interim allocation and transfer rules of an equilibrium
outcome of an auction rule A ∈ A∗ if and only if the following conditions hold:
(M) Qi is nondecreasing, ∀i ∈ N ;
(Env) Ti(vi) = viQi(vi)−
∫ vi
vi
Qi(s)ds+ T (vi)− viQi(vi), ∀vi ∈ Vi,∀i ∈ N ;









Fi(vi),∀v ∈ V .
It is well known that the conditions (M), (Env), and (IR′) are necessary and sufficient
for any interim rule (Q, T ) to satisfy (IC) and (IR). The last condition (B), which we
shall refer to as capacity constraint, captures the feasibility of an interim allocation rule;
more precisely, the condition is necessary and sufficient for there to be an ex-post allocation
rule, q = (q1, ..., qn) : V → Q, that gives rise to Q as an associated interim allocation rule.7
Combining these observations, the necessity of conditions (M) − (B) is immediate. The
sufficiency can be argued as follows: For any Q satisfying (B), there exists an (ex-post)
allocation rule q that gives rise to Q as an associated interim allocation. We can then set
7See Mierendorff (2011) or Che et al. (2013). This characterization generalizes Border (1991)’s charac-





if Qi(θi) > 0 and ti(θ) = 0 otherwise, to obtain the desired auction rule in
Lemma 1.
2.3. A Model of Collusion. Our model of collusion does not involve exchanges of side-
payments among cartel members. Instead, the members of a cartel can only collude by
coordinating their messages in the auction. Since a non-participation message is included
in the auction rule, bidders are also able to coordinate their participation decisions. As
mentioned in the introduction, we abstract from the question of how a cartel can enforce
an agreement among its members, but rather focus on whether there will be an incentive
compatible agreement that is beneficial for all bidders.8
To this end, we consider an agreement by which the bidders may coordinate their bids.
Formally, a cartel agreement is a mapping α : V → ∆(B) that specifies a lottery over
possible bid profiles in auction A for each profile of valuations for the bidders. We envision
bidders in the cartel to commit to submitting their private information to the cartel (e.g.,
an uninformed mediator) and bidding according to its subsequent recommendation. To
be precise, a cartel agreement, if unanimously accepted, leads bidders to play a game of
incomplete information where each player’s strategy is to report his type to the cartel and
then outcomes are determined by the lottery α over bids and auction rule A. Hence, for
any cartel agreement α, one can equivalently consider a direct mechanism it induces as
follows.
Definition 2. A direct mechanism M˜A = (q˜, t˜) is a cartel manipulation of A if there
exists a cartel agreement α such that9
q˜i(v) = Eα(v)[ξi(b)] and t˜i(v) = Eα(v)[τi(b)],∀v ∈ V , i ∈ N.
Since M˜A results from bidders’ equilibrium play in the incomplete information game
described above, it is without loss to require that M˜A be incentive compatible, i.e. satisfy
(IC). Our goal is to investigate whether any auction A ∈ A∗ is susceptible to some cartel
manipulation M˜A. To analyze this, one must know what sort of cartel manipulation will
be accepted by the bidders; and this in turn requires one to analyze what happens when a
bidder refuses a proposed manipulation. The latter in turn depends on the beliefs formed on
8This is consistent with MM and LM and most of the literature on the auction collusion.
9Here, Eα(v)[·] denotes the expectation taken by using the probability distribution α(v) ∈ ∆(B).
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the bidder who refuses a proposed manipulation and the abilities of the remaining bidders
to punish such a bidder.
To address these issues, we initially follow the weak notion of collusion, originally devel-
oped by LM. According to this notion, a cartel manipulation takes effect when all bidders
accept it, and if at least one bidder refuses a proposed manipulation, this does not trigger
any revision of beliefs on the subsequent play; that is, all bidders play the auction game A
non-cooperatively with their prior beliefs. Since the latter play yields the (interim) payoff
of UMAi (vi) to a bidder i with valuation vi, for a cartel manipulation M˜A to be accepted
unanimously, we must have U M˜Ai (vi) ≥ UMAi (vi),∀vi, i. For the manipulation to be strictly
profitable, this inequality must hold strictly for some bidder type(s). Hence, the weak
notion is stated as follows:
Definition 3. Given an auction A, its collusion-free equilibrium outcome MA is weakly
collusion-proof (or WCP) if there exists no cartel manipulation M˜A of A satisfying
(IC) and
(C − IR) U M˜Ai (vi) ≥ UMAi (vi),∀vi, i, with strict inequality for some vi, i.
According to this definition, an auction is susceptible to bidder collusion if and only
if there exists a cartel manipulation that interim Pareto dominates its collusion-free out-
come.10 This notion of collusion-proofness should be interpreted as a necessary requirement
for an auction rule to be unsusceptible to cartel manipulation. If an auction rule fails to
be weakly collusion-proof, then one should expect weak cartels to be a concern. How-
ever, it could be argued that weak cartels may still form, even when an auction is weakly
collusion-proof. For example, there could be cartels that may benefit only a subset of bid-
ders perhaps for some types, possibly at the expense of the other bidders. We address this
issue in Section 5, by showing that the notion of collusion-proofness can be strengthened
significantly without altering the outcome that a seller can obtain from the auction.
10As Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) argue, if an equilibrium outcome of an auction mechanism is
interim Pareto dominated by another outcome resulting from a cartel manipulation, then there is unanimous
agreement, without any communication taking place among bidders, that everyone will be better off by
joining the cartel.
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3. When Are Auctions Susceptible to Weak Cartels?
In this section, we study the conditions that make an auction in the class A∗ weakly
collusion-proof. First, we provide a necessary condition for an auction to be weakly
collusion-proof (Theorem 1). Next we prove that this condition is also sufficient, when
we consider auctions that satisfy two further natural requirements (Theorem 2).
To state the necessity result, let us define the reserve price faced by bidder i as:
ri := inf{ Ti(vi)
Qi(vi)
: Qi(vi) > 0}. (1)
It is straightforward to see that Qi(vi) = 0 if vi < ri and Qi(vi) > 0 only if vi ≥ ri.11
Theorem 1. Suppose that an equilibrium outcome MA of an auction rule A ∈ A∗ is
weakly collusion-proof. Then, each interim allocation Qi must be constant in any interval
(a, b) ⊂ (ri, vi] on which fi is nondecreasing.
Proof. See Appendix A (page 26).
This result implies that if fi is nondecreasing in an interval of types for bidder i, there
is a scope for a profitable cartel manipulation unless the bidder’s winning probability is
constant in his value over that interval. To see the logic behind this result, suppose that in
(collusion-free) equilibrium, bidder i’s winning probability Qi(vi) is strictly increasing in a
certain region [a, b] where fi is nondecreasing (or Fi is convex). Then, one can construct
a cartel manipulation, labeled M˜A, that: (i) leaves unchanged the interim probability of
winning and expected payments of all bidders other than bidder i and also of bidder i when
his value is outside [a, b] and (ii) gives the good to bidder i with a constant probability p¯





Fi(b)− Fi(a) , (2)
that is, p¯ is set equal to bidder i’s average winning probability over the interval [a, b] in
MA.
11To see this, suppose that Qi(vi) > 0 for some vi < ri. Then, by definition of ri, we have vi < ri ≤ Ti(vi)Qi(vi)
or viQi(vi)− Ti(vi) < 0, contradicting the (IR) condition.
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Our proof in Appendix A shows that (i) this cartel manipulation can be implemented by
the bidders in auction A; and (ii) it is acceptable to all bidders in the sense of satisfying
(C − IR), thus making the auction not weakly collusion-proof.
To see (ii) (assuming that (i) is true), recall that the payoffs of all other bidders remain
unchanged, and observe how bidder i’s payoff is changed by the manipulation. Absent
collusion, we know that that bidder i will earn the interim payoff of






when his valuation is vi ∈ [a, b]. Under the manipulation M˜A, bidder i with valuation
vi ∈ [a, b] will earn











where the last equality follows from (2). Note that the payoff in each of two cases rises at
a speed equal to the winning probability. Since Qi rises strictly whereas p¯ is constant, the
payoff without manipulation is strictly convex whereas the payoff under manipulation rises
linearly, as depicted by Figure 1. Essentially, the manipulation speeds up the rate of payoff
increase for lower value and slows down the rate for the higher value. Since Fi is convex in
[a, b] and since Qi is strictly increasing,∫ b
a





Substituting (5) into (4) for vi = b, we get






In other words, bidder i with valuation vi = b will be at least weakly better off from the
manipulation. Given the curvatures of these two payoff functions, then the bidder will be
strictly better off from the manipulation for any intermediate value vi ∈ (a, b) (see the left
panel of Figure 1).
The same argument explains why this manipulation may not work if fi is decreasing (or
equivalently, Fi is strictly concave). In this case, the inequality of (5) is reversed. Hence, as
shown in the right panel of Figure 1, bidder i will be strictly worse off from the manipulation
when his valuation is vi ≈ b. This means that the weak cartel will not be able to induce




fi is decreasing on [a, b]
a b vi
UMAi (vi)




Figure 1. Profitability of Manipulation
them to sacrifice the probability of obtaining the object to such an extent that cannot be
compensated by a lower expected payment. Although we do not formally model this, there
is a sense in which the cartel unravels in this case. With the highest types dropping out,
the expected payoff from manipulation falls (the straight line in the right panel rotates
down), and given strict concavity of the value distributions, the next highest types also
become worse off, and drop out. This process continues until the cartel unravels.
To complete our argument, we need to verify (i) above, i.e. the issue of how to implement
the desired manipulation. In fact, pooling the types of bidder i in [a, b] requires shifting
the winning probability away from high types toward low value types of bidder i, and it is
not clear whether and how such a shifting of the winning probabilities can be engineered
to occur in equilibrium, especially without altering the payoffs of the other bidders.
As a first step, we observe that the interim allocation from M˜A, Q˜, satisfies the condition
(B), so it is feasible in the sense that there is an ex-post allocation rule q˜ that gives rise to
Q˜ as the associated interim allocation rule. The tricky part is how to replicate the interim
transfer T˜ , which makes M˜A incentive compatible, along with the above allocation q˜ via a
weak cartel manipulation (that does not use any side payments among the cartel members).
The winner-payability plays a role here. Since the cartel can employ a randomizing device,
WEAL CARTELS 16
the winner-payability allows the cartel to generate, for each profile of reported values, a
distribution of bids that produces q˜ and T˜ (in expectation) for the proposed manipulation.12
Theorem 1 suggests that a winner-payable auction which assigns the object with higher
probability to bidders with higher values is vulnerable to weak cartels unless each bidder’s
value distribution is strictly concave everywhere. The following three corollaries state (un-
der certain technical qualifications) that (i) standard auctions, (ii) seller’s optimal auctions
(i.e. those which implement Myerson’s optimal auction), and (iii) efficient auctions are all
susceptible to weak cartels unless all distributions of values are strictly decreasing.
Corollary 1. Letting v := mini∈N vi and v := maxi∈N vi, assume that v > v. Then,
the collusion-free equilibrium outcomes (in weakly undominated strategies) of first-price,
second-price, English, or Dutch auctions, with a reserve price r < v, are not WCP if fi(vi)
is nondecreasing in vi for vi ∈ (a, b) ⊂ Vi, for some b > r and a ≥ v, for some bidder i.
Proof. See Appendix A (page 29).
Corollary 2. Suppose that the virtual valuation, Ji(vi) := vi− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) , is strictly increas-
ing in vi for all i ∈ N . Suppose also that fi(vi) is nondecreasing vi for vi ∈ (a, b) ⊂ (ri, vi],
Ji(b) > 0, and maxj 6=i Jj(vj) < Ji(b) < maxj 6=i Jj(vj), for some bidder i. Then, all auction
rules in A∗ that maximize the seller’s revenue are not WCP.
Proof. The hypotheses guarantee that there exists an interval [b − , b] with  > 0, where
Qi(vi) is strictly increasing in the optimal auction. The result follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3. Suppose that fi is nondecreasing on some interval (a, b) ∈ (ri, vi] and
maxj 6=i vj < b < maxj 6=i vj, for some bidder i. Then, all auction rules in A∗ whose equilib-
rium outcomes are efficient are not WCP.
Proof. The hypotheses guarantee that there exists an interval [b − , b] with  > 0, where
Qi(vi) is strictly increasing in any efficient auction. The result follows from Theorem 1.
The next result establishes a converse of Theorem 1: a sufficient condition for an auction
rule to be weakly collusion-proof. The sufficiency requires two further conditions, which
roughly speaking provide minimal optimality requirements from the seller’s perspective.
12Winner-payability is sufficient for the cartel to essentially attain any incentive compatible allocation
for values above reserve prices. Therefore, focusing on set of auctions that allows for reserve prices but is
larger than A∗ would not make collusion any easier for the cartel.
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Theorem 2. Suppose that an auction rule A ∈ A∗ satisfies τi(b) ≥ ξi(b)vi,∀b ∈ B,∀i
and that its collusion free outcome MA = (Q, T ) satisfies condition (B) with equality at
r1, . . . , rn. If, for each i ∈ N , Qi is constant wherever fi is nondecreasing in some interval
of (ri, vi], then the chosen equilibrium outcome is weakly collusion-proof.
Proof. See Appendix A (page 29).
The two conditions rule out auctions that are clearly undesirable from the seller’s per-
spective in the sense that either it leaves the object unsold even though selling raises her
revenue without altering incentives, or it sells the object to a bidder at a price below his
lowest possible value.13 Given these additional optimality conditions, the intuition behind
this result is essentially the flip-side of the intuition behind Theorem 1. In other words,
starting from the suggested equilibrium, any manipulation including, but not limited to,
those that involve pooling of some types, must leave some bidder types strictly worse off.
Theorem 2 has the following immediate corollary, which collects in a single statement
the natural counterparts to the three previous corollaries to Theorem 1.
Corollary 4. If fi is (strictly) decreasing for all i ∈ N , then the following auctions
are WCP: (i) the collusion-free equilibrium equilibria of first-price, second-price, English,
or Dutch auctions, with reserve price r ≥ maxi∈N vi (ii) any equilibrium of any auction
τi(b) ≥ ξi(b)vi,∀b ∈ B,∀i that results in an efficient allocation, and (iii) any equilibrium of
any auction that maximizes the seller’s revenue.
Proof. The proof is immediate given Theorem 2 and the fact that fi is (strictly) decreasing
for all i ∈ N .
Our characterization of collusion-proof auctions in Theorem 1 and 2 contrasts with that of
MM, who assume the cartel can successfully form if bidders benefit ex-ante from collusion.
In the symmetric environment, they show that if the hazard rate of value distribution
is increasing, then a cartel will always form (all bidders will submit a bid equal to the
reserve price to randomly allocate the object among them). Our results highlight that
13It is easy to see that without a sufficiently high reserve price when the lowest possible valuation is
sufficiently high, all standard auctions are susceptible to weak cartels. Consider, for instance, a first-price
auction in which the lower bound of value support, v, is very high while there is no reserve price. Then,
bidders will find it Pareto-improving to identically bid zero and share the object with equal probability.
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ignoring the bidders’ interim incentives to participate in the cartel overstates their ability
to collude, to the extent that the increasing hazard rate condition is quite mild. This has
an important implication on the design of the optimal collusion-proof auction. In MM, the
only instrument available for the seller to cope with weak cartels is the choice of reserve
price whereas in our case the problem of designing the optimal collusion-proof auction
becomes nontrivial, as we show in the next section.
4. Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions
If an auction is not weakly collusion-proof, then bidders will be able to coordinate their
bidding strategies to achieve a different outcome which will make everyone better off. There-
fore, if the seller has designed an auction to maximize revenue without taking into account
the possibility of collusion, and the auction is not collusion-proof, then collusion will lead
to lower expected revenue.
Corollary 2 shows that in a wide range of circumstances, the seller’s optimal auction will
not be weakly collusion-proof. Then, what is the best outcome the seller can achieve in
a collusion-proof way? In this section, we look for an auction that maximizes the seller’s
revenue among all collusion-proof auctions. Consistent with our general approach to the
problem, we require the seller to employ a winner-payable auction.
Using Lemma 1 and the necessary condition given in Theorem 1, we can write the seller’s








subject to (M), (B), and the collusion-proof constraint for all i ∈ N
(CP ) Qi is constant whenever fi is nondecreasing in some interval of (ri, vi].
The objective function is the (well-known) expression of the seller’s expected revenue
that is obtained by substituting condition (Env) into the original objective function for
the seller. We have also used the fact that (IR′) is binding at the optimum for the lowest
types, i.e. for all i ∈ N , T (vi) = viQi(vi). The constraint (M) is required for the incentive
compatibility. Lastly, the constraint (CP ) arises from the weak collusion-proofness, namely
the characterization given by Theorems 1 and 2.
14Recall that Ji(s) = s− 1−Fi(s)fi(s) is the virtual valuation function for bidder i with value s.
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Unfortunately, the problem [P ] is not tractable to solve in full generality. Hence, we
focus on a restricted class of value distributions where either bidders are symmetric with a
single-peaked density or all bidders have nondecreasing (and possibly asymmetric) densities.
First, consider symmetric bidders with a single-peaked density. Specifically, it is assumed
that, for each i ∈ N , we have Fi = F for some distribution F with continuous density f ,
which is single-peaked in the sense that there is a value v∗ ∈ V = [v, v] such that
f(v) is (weakly) increasing in v for v < v∗ and (weakly) decreasing in v for v > v∗. It
is possible that v∗ = v or v∗ = v, so single-peakedness include the cases in which f is
nondecreasing or nonincreasing everywhere. Indeed, the condition is satisfied by many
well known distributions, including Cauchy, Exponential, Logistic, Normal, Uniform, and
Weibull. Further, we assume that the virtual valuation J(·) is nondecreasing. Finally, we
only consider the case in which v∗ > inf{v ∈ [v, v]|J(v) ≥ 0}, because otherwise Myerson’s
optimal auction is weakly collusion-proof according to Theorem 2 and is trivially optimal.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal collusion-proof auction in A∗.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Fi = F, ∀i ∈ N and the density f is single-peaked. Suppose also
that v∗ > vˆ := inf{v ∈ [v, v]|J(v) ≥ 0}. Then, the solution of [P ] is given by:
Qi(v) =

F (v)n−1 if v > v∗
F (v∗)n−i
∏i−1
k=1 F (rk) if v ∈ [ri, v∗]
0 otherwise
. (7)
where vˆ = rn < rn−1 < · · · < r1 < v∗ and











Proof. See Appendix B (page 32).
The optimal auction allocates the object as follows: If there is at least one bidder with
valuation above v∗, then the optimal auction allocates the object to the bidder with the
highest valuation. If every bidder’s valuation is below v∗, then the seller allocates the object
to bidder 1 if his valuation is in [r1, v
∗], to bidder 2 if v1 < r1 and v2 ∈ [r2, v∗], and so on,
where r1 > r2 > · · · > rn = vˆ. The seller does not allocate the object to any bidder if
vi < ri, ∀i. Payments are determined to make the allocation rule incentive compatible, i.e.,
according to (Env).
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The optimal weakly collusion-proof auction can be implemented via a (winner-payable)
procedure that combines a second-price auction with individualized reserve prices and a
sequential one-on-one negotiation (in case the auction does not sell the object), described
more precisely as follows:
Corollary 5. Let (r1, · · · , rn) be those defined in (8), and let (R1, · · · , Rn) satisfy




The optimal weakly collusion-proof auction can be implemented as a Perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of the following procedure. First, the seller holds a second-price (or English) auction
with individualized minimum prices (R1, · · · , Rn). If the auction does not sell the object,
then the seller approaches the bidders in the order of the bidder index, and makes take-it-
or-leave offer of ri to bidder i, in case each bidder j < i has rejected the seller’s offer of
rj.
Proof. The left and right hand sides of (9) correspond to the payoffs that bidder i with
value v∗ can obtain in the second-price auction and in the sequential take-it-or-leave-it
offers, respectively, provided that all other bidder j bids his value in the second-price
auction if vj ≥ v∗ while bidding zero to accept the offer rj afterwards if vj ∈ [rj, v∗). Since
bidder i with value v∗ is indifferent between two payoffs, it is straightforward to see that
absent collusion, the optimal strategy for bidder i is also to bid his value in the second-price
auction if vi ≥ v∗, and to bid zero and accept the offer ri afterwards if vi ∈ [ri, v∗). Clearly,
this auction rule and its equilibrium outcome satisfy the sufficient condition of Theorem 2
and is thus collusion-proof.
Observe that our optimal collusion-proof auction allocates the object less frequently
compared to optimal mechanism in the collusion-free environment, since each bidder i(6= n)
with valuation vi ∈ [vˆ, ri) is allocated the object in the latter, but not in our environment.
This feature also appears in the optimal (collusion-proof) auction rule of MM. A novel and
interesting feature of our optimal auction rule is that it treats bidders asymmetrically even
though they are ex-ante symmetric. Because the common virtual valuation is increasing, the
seller maximizes revenue by assigning the object efficiently, whenever bidders have v > v∗,
and this is also collusion-proof in light of Theorem 2, since the density is decreasing in
this region. However, for values below v∗ our collusion-proofness constraint is binding and
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forces the seller to provide the good to each bidder with a constant probability whenever
the probability is positive. This means that, for values below v∗, the seller is unable to
discriminate each bidder based on his valuations. The seller can only exclude allocation to
all values below a certain threshold, determined by a reserve price, and assign the good to all
the remaining types between the reserve price and v∗ with the same probability. Therefore,
the only remaining way for the seller to price-discriminate across different valuations is by
discriminating across ex-ante identical bidders. The seller accomplishes this by charging
a higher price to a bidder she approaches earlier (who thus enjoys a higher probability of
obtaining the good) than those she approaches later. This feature of the mechanism shows
that the asymmetric mechanism can be a useful device by which the seller can increase the
revenue against collusive bidders, when she is restricted to use winner-payable auctions.
Remark 1. If, for some exogenous reason, the seller is not allowed to use an asymmetric
mechanism, the optimal winner payable auction will still be a sequential procedure. It will
combine an efficient assignment for values above v∗, with a subsequent simultaneous take-
it-or-leave-it offer to all bidders (with a fair lottery in case of excess demand), if the object
remains unsold in the auction.
When bidders are asymmetric, computing the optimal auction in full generality becomes
intractable. However, building on the insight we developed earlier, we can find the revenue
maximizing mechanism when the density fi is nondecreasing for all i ∈ N . In this case,
Theorems 1 and 2 require the interim winning probability for each bidder i to be constant
in the range [ri, vi] and to be equal to zero in [vi, ri). Hence, the seller’s problem reduces
to choosing r1, . . . , rn optimally, taking into account that the n constant interim winning
probabilities are pinned down by binding capacity constraint (B). This problem can be
reformulated as follows:
















where Π is the set of all permutation functions pi : N → N . At the solution of (10), ri ≥ rj
if pi(i) < pi(j).
Proof. See Appendix B (page 38).
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This result says that an algorithm for finding the optimal mechanism is first to find
an optimal profile (ri)i∈N for each possible order pi, and then to choose the order pi that
achieves the highest revenue. In terms of practical implementation, pi represents the order
in which the seller makes a set of sequential take-it-or-leave-it offers (ri)i∈N . Given an order
pi, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer ri to bidder i if all bidders approached earlier
have rejected the seller’s offers, which occurs with probability
∏
j:pi(j)<pi(i) Fj(rj). The result
also says that the seller offers a (weakly) higher price to whomever is approached earlier.
5. Strengthening the Notion of Collusion-Proofness
The weak notion of collusion-proofness presumes that a cartel will form if, and only if, all
bidders benefit at least weakly from coordinating their bids. This provides a conservative
test on the susceptibility of an auction to bidder collusion; if an auction fails to be weakly
collusion-proof, there will be a consensus among bidders to form a cartel and manipulate
the auction. At the same time, the limited scope of collusion it allows for leaves open the
possibility that even weakly collusion-proof auctions may be susceptible to collusion.
In this section, we show that the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism identified
in the previous section can be made unsusceptible to collusion in a much stronger sense.
To this end, we stack the deck against the seller by taking a quite permissive approach
on how cartels form and behave. First, any informed bidder(s) as well as an uninformed
mediator is allowed to propose a cartel manipulation. Second, the cartel formation need
not be all-inclusive; so there can be partial or multiple cartels in operation. Also, bidders
need not unanimously agree to form a cartel, in the sense that after some bidders reject a
cartel proposal, the remaining bidders can form an alternative cartel. Further, if a bidder
refuses to participate, the remaining bidders may punish the refusing bidder. We then show
that the outcome of the optimal collusion-proof auction identified in the previous section
can be implemented even if cartels can form and behave as outlined above, as long as cartel
members plays only cartel-undominated strategies — a notion which is formalized in
the next paragraph.
Take an auction A ∈ A∗ and let uAi (b | vi) = viξi(b) − τi(b) for any bid profile b ∈ B,
i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi. For any potential cartel C ⊂ N , let bC = (bi)i∈C and bN\C = (bi)i∈N\C
denote two arbitrary bid profiles for bidders within C and bidders outside C, respectively.
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C , b˜N\C |vi) ≤ uAi (b′′C , b˜N\C |vi),∀b˜N\C and ∀i ∈ C
with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ C and one b˜N\C . We say that a bid profile b′C is
cartel-undominated at vC if there is no b
′′
C that cartel-dominates it.
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We now describe a cartel-game and present our notion of robust collusion-proofness.
A cartel game starts after the seller has announced auction A. All bidders and uninformed
third parties are allowed to propose cartel agreements to other bidders (not necessarily
to all bidders). Analogous to our earlier definition of an all-inclusive cartel agreement,
an agreement specifies a mapping from reports to lotteries over bids for the participating
bidders. However, the agreement in this case also specifies which agreement comes into
force among accepting bidders depending on the set of accepting and rejecting bidders.
With all available — possibly multiple — proposals, each bidder decides which proposal, if
any, to accept. If a bidder accepts a cartel proposal, then he commits to it. We assume that
no bidder can accept more than one proposal and that each bidder’s decision to accept or
reject a proposal is observable to the proposer.16 Following this stage, bidders update their
beliefs about others’ types based on the proposals — and possibly acceptance/rejection
decisions — they have observed. Given the updated beliefs, they play in the subsequent
auction A.
Definition 4. An auction A with (interim) equilibrium outcome (Qi, Ti)i∈N is robustly
collusion-proof (or RCP) if there exists no equilibrium outcome of a cartel-game fol-
lowing A which is different from (Qi, Ti)i∈N for at least one i ∈ N and a positive measure
of vi ∈ Vi, and where cartel-undominated strategies are played at any history.
Finally, we now state the main result of this section. This result follows from a more
general result (Theorem 6) provided in Appendix C, where we show that if a WCP mecha-
nism satisfies two conditions, monotone dominant strategy incentive compatibility
(mDSIC) and weak non-bossiness, then it is also robustly collusion-proof.
15Observe that this condition impose less restrictions on cartel behavior than requiring that every bidder
plays a weakly-undominated strategy.
16Our result does not depend on whether or not bidders other than the proposer can observe the
acceptance/rejection decision.
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Theorem 5. There exists a robustly collusion-proof auction which implements the same
(interim) equilibrium outcome as the optimal WCP auction identified in Theorem 3.
Proof. See Appendix C (page 43).
In addition to the result above, the following result is also a straightforward corollary of
Theorem 6 in Appendix C. The proof is omitted.
Corollary 6. (i) If fi is increasing for all i ∈ N then the optimal mechanism of Theorem
4 is RCP. (ii) If fi is (strictly) decreasing for all i ∈ N then the Myerson optimal auction
with the canonical payment rule is RCP.17
6. Conclusion
The possibility of exchanging side payments facilitates the formation of profitable cartels.
Cartels with side-payments can always be arranged at standard private value auctions in a
way that is beneficial for all cartel members. In light of this, it would be natural to expect
that in the absence of side-payments, cartels should be more difficult to sustain.
The result of McAfee and McMillan (1992) contradicts this intuition. As far as we
maintain the standard assumption of increasing hazard rate, collusion is always profitable
for bidders ex-ante, even in the case in which the cartel is weak. In this paper, we take an
alternative approach by considering the bidders’ interim incentives to form a weak cartel.
We do not limit our analysis to standard first- or second-price auction, but consider a
broad class of auctions that are winner-payable. We provide a tight, sufficient and necessary,
condition for an auction in this class to be weakly collusion-proof, which requires that
whenever there is some bidder whose value distribution is convex in some interval, he must
obtain a constant interim winning probability in that interval. Hence, for instance, when
all value distributions are decreasing, the classic revenue-maximizing auction is collusion-
proof. In this case, any attempt to form a cartel, even an all inclusive one facilitated by a
mediator, unravels.
Our characterization of collusion-proof auctions leads us to identify an optimal auction
that maximizes the revenue of the seller facing a weak cartel. For a broad class of value
distributions with single-peaked density, the optimal mechanism consists of an auction with
17See Appendix C, equation (41), for a formal definition of the canonical payment rule.
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a relatively high reserve price, followed by one-to-one negotiations with bidders in case the
object is unsold at the auction. An interesting feature that emerges from this mechanism is
that the auctioneer may benefit from treating bidders asymmetrically. While an increasing
interim allocation helps screen across different types of any individual bidder, if it cannot
be implemented due to collusion among bidders, the seller should rather choose to screen
across bidders by treating them asymmetrically.
Finally, our optimal collusion-proof auctions continue to be collusion-proof under a va-
riety of different, less restrictive, collusion formation scenarios, as far as we maintain the
mild requirement that cartels always play undominated strategies.
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Appendix Appendix A:. Proofs for Section 3





if vi ∈ [ri, vi]
0 otherwise
.
It is straightforward to see that the function Bi is nondecreasing.
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Suppose now for a contradiction that MA = (q, t) is WCP but Qk(·) is not constant in
the interval (a,b) ⊂ (rk, vk] for some k ∈ N , where fk is nondecreasing.
Let us define Q˜(·) = (Q˜1, · · · , Q˜n) as follows:
Q˜i(vi) =
p¯ if i = k and vi ∈ (a, b)Qi(vi) otherwise , (11)





Observe first that Q˜ satisfies (M). For this, we only need to check that Qk(a) ≤ p¯ =∫ b
a Qk(s)dFk(s)
(Fk(b)−Fk(a)) ≤ Qk(b), which clearly holds since Qk(·) is nondecreasing. The next claim
shows that, in addition to (M), Q˜ also satisfies (B).
Claim 1. The interim allocation rule Q˜(·) satisfies (B).
















18To see it, suppose to the contrary that there are two types vi and v˜i > vi such that Qi(v˜i) ≥ Qi(vi) > 0
but Bi(v˜i) < Bi(vi). Then, U
MA
i (vi) = Qi(vi)(vi −Bi(vi)) < Qi(v˜i)(vi −Bi(v˜i)) so vi finds it profitable to
deviate to v˜i’s strategy.
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Note that (13) clearly holds for vk ≥ b since Q˜k(s) = Qk(s),∀s ∈ [b, vk]. Let us pick





























where the second equality follows from the definition of p¯, and the inequality from the fact



























where the inequality follows from (14).
From Q˜, we can derive an interim transfer rule T˜ by fixing T˜i(ri) = Ti(ri) for all i ∈ N
and then using (Env). Since the profile (Q˜, T˜ ) thus defined satisfies all the conditions in
Lemma 1, we can find an auction rule whose equilibrium outcome is a direct mechanism
M˜A = (q˜, t˜) that has (Q˜, T˜ ) as the interim rule.
Let us first show that M˜A interim Pareto dominates the original equilibrium payoff of
the auction rule A (i.e. satisfies (C − IR)). First, it is clear that all other bidders than k
will have their payoffs unaffected. Moreover, bidder k’s payoff will only be affected when
his value is above a. To show that U M˜Ak (vk) ≥ UMAk (vk) for all vk ∈ [a, vk], with strict
inequality for some vk, it suffices to show that U
M˜A
k (b) ≥ UMAk (b), since U M˜Ak (·) is linear in
[a, b] while UMAk (·) is convex but not linear, and since Q˜k(vk) = Qk(vk) for all vk ∈ (b, vk]
so U˜k(·) and Uk(·) have the same slope beyond b.
WEAL CARTELS 28















where the inequality follows since both Qk(·) and fk(·) are nondecreasing in the interval
(a, b). Rearranging yields





k (b)− UMAk (a).
or U M˜Ak (b) ≥ UMAk (b) since U M˜Ak (a) = UMAk (a).
Then, the desired contradiction will follow if we show that M˜A can be implemented via
a weak cartel manipulation. To this end, let B˜i(vi) =
T˜i(v)
Q˜i(vi)
if vi ∈ [ri, vi] and B˜i(vi) = 0
otherwise.19 We then exploit the winner-payability property to establish the following
result:
Claim 2. Given the winner payability, for any given vi ∈ [ri, vi], there exists a randomiza-
tion over bid profiles bi and b
i
, denoted µi(vi) ∈ [0, 1], such that
µi(vi)τi(b
i) + (1− µi(vi))τi(bi) = B˜i(vi). (15)
Proof. First, we show that
Bi(ri) ≤ B˜i(vi) ≤ Bi(vi),∀vi ∈ [ri, vi],∀i. (16)
This is immediate if i 6= k or if i = k and vk ∈ [vk, a] since in those cases, Bi(vi) = B˜i(vi)
and Bi(·) is nondecreasing. Consider now i = k and any vk ∈ (a, vk]. The first inequality of
(16) holds trivially. To prove the latter inequality, it suffices to show that B˜i(vi) ≤ Bi(vi),
since B˜i(·) is nondecreasing. This inequality holds trivially if vk = b since Bk(b) ≥ Bk(a) =
B˜k(a) = B˜k(b). If vk > b, then Qk(vk) = Q˜k(vk) and also
T (vk)− T˜ (vk) = vkQk(vk)− vkQ˜k(vk) + U M˜Ak (vk)− UMAk (vk) = U M˜Ak (vk)− UMAk (vk) ≥ 0.
This implies Bi(vi) ≥ B˜i(vi).




| ξi(b) > 0, b ∈ B
} ≤ Bi(vi) ≤ sup{τi(b)
ξi(b)










) are equal to the LHS and RHS of the above equation, respec-
tively. Combining this with (16) means that for each vi ∈ [ri, vi], B˜i(vi) ∈ [τi(bi), τi(bi)],
which guarantees the existence of µi(vi) as in (15).
Then, if the cartel members report v ∈ V such that vi ≥ ri for some i ∈ N , let the cartel
bid bi with probability q˜i(v)µ
i(v) and b
i
with q˜i(v)(1 − µi(v)). So each bidder i obtains
the object with probability q˜i(v) and pays q˜i(v)B˜i(vi) in expectation. If there is no cartel
member with vi ≥ ri, then let the cartel bid (b01, · · · , b0n). It is straightforward to verify
that the interim allocation and payment from this manipulation are Q˜i(vi) and T˜i(vi) for
each bidder i with value vi, as desired.
Proof of Corollary 1: Fix a bidder k for whom fk is nondecreasing on some interval
(a, b) with b > r and a ≥ v. We show that in any standard auction, the winning probability
of bidder k is non-constant in the interval (max{a, r}, b), which will imply by Theorem 1
that the auction is not WCP. Consider first the second-price and English auctions where
each bidder bids his value in the undominated strategy. The interim winning probability
of bidder k with vk ∈ (max{a, r}, b) is equal to Qk(vk) =
∏
i 6=k Fi(vk), which is strictly
increasing in the interval (max{a, r}, b).
Consider next the first-price auction (or Dutch auction since the two auctions are strate-
gically equivalent). Note first that in undominated strategy equilibrium, (i) no bidder bids
more than his value and (ii) no bidder puts an atom at any bid B if B wins with posi-
tive probability. Letting βi(·) denote bidder i’s equilibrium strategy, note also that βi(·)
is nondecreasing. Given (i), we must have Qk(vk) > 0 for all vk ∈ (max{a, r}, b) since he
can always bid some amount B ∈ (max{a, r}, vk) and enjoy a positive payoff. Next, by
(ii), there must be some vk ∈ (max{a, r}, b) such that βk(vk) < βk(b) since otherwise βk(b)
would be an atom bid. For such vk, we must have Qk(vk) < Qk(b) so Qk(·) is non-constant
in (max{a, r}, b). To see why, suppose to the contrary that Qk(vk) = Qk(b), which implies
that no one else is submitting any bid between βk(vk) and βk(b). Then, bidder k with value
b can profitably deviate to lower his bid below βk(b) but above βk(vk), a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2: To begin, for each i ∈ N , we partition V i = [ri, vi] into a two
families, {V ji }j∈J+i and {V
j
i }j∈J−i , of countably many intervals such that f ′i(v) ≥ 0 for a.e.
v ∈ V ji for j ∈ J+i , and f ′i(v) < 0 for a.e. v ∈ V ji for j ∈ J−i . In particular, each interval
V ji , j ∈ J−i can be taken to be an open interval. (One of the index sets J+i and J−i can be
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empty as fi can be everywhere nondecreasing or everywhere increasing.) This partitioning
is well-defined since fi is absolutely continuous. Let V+i := ∪j∈J+i V
j
i and V−i := ∪j∈J−i V
j
i .
Consider an auction A which induces an equilibrium whose interim allocation probability










We prove that A is unsusceptible to collusion.
Define Gi to be the locally concave hull of Fi, defined as follows: For each v ∈ V ji ,∀j ∈
J+i ∪ J−i ,
Gi(v) := max{sFi(v′) + (1− s)Fi(v′′)|s ∈ [0, 1], v′, v′′ ∈ V ji , and sv′ + (1− s)v′′ = v}.
In words, Gi is the lowest function such that Gi(·) ≥ Fi(·) and that it satisfies concavity in
each interval V ji . Clearly, if V
j
i ⊂ V−i , then Gi(v) = Fi(v) for all v ∈ V ji , and if V ji ⊂ V+i ,
then Gi(v) is linear in v for all v ∈ V ji . Clearly, Gi admits density, denoted gi, for almost
every v ∈ Vi. More importantly, while Gi need not be globally concave, g′i(v) ≤ 0 for
almost every v ∈ Vi.
Consider any any weak cartel manipulation M˜A = (q˜, t˜) implementing an interim Pareto
improvement. Since by assumption τi(b) ≥ ξi(b)vi,∀i ∈ N, ∀b ∈ B and M˜A is a weak
manipulation of A, we must have
U M˜Ai (vi) ≤ max
b∈B
ξi(b)vi − τi(b) ≤ max
b∈B
ξi(b)vi − ξi(b)vi = 0
so due to (C−IR), U M˜Ai (vi) = 0 for each i ∈ N . A similar reasoning also yields UMAi (vi) = 0
for each i ∈ N . Then, interim Pareto domination implies that
Xi(vi) := U
M˜A
i (vi)− UMAi (vi) =
∫ vi
ri
(Q˜i(s)−Qi(s))ds ≥ 0,∀i, vi. (17)






















































where the first equality follows from the integration by parts, and the inequality holds since,
for each i ∈ N , Xi(v) ≥ 0, g′i(v) ≤ 0 for a.e. v ∈ Vi (by definition of gi), and, whenever
Gi(vi) > Fi(vi), Q
′
i(vi) = 0 ≤ Q˜′i(vi) (by the monotonicity of Q˜i).
The last inequality combined with (18) means that the inequality must hold as equality,
which in turn implies that Xi(v) = 0 for a.e. v ∈ V−i for each i ∈ N . We next prove
that Q˜i(v) ≥ Qi(v) for a.e. v ∈ Vi. To prove this, suppose to the contrary that there
exists v > ri such that Q˜i(v) < Qi(v). Then, since Xi(·) ≥ 0 implies that there is some v′
(arbitrarily) close to ri with Q˜i(v
′) ≥ Qi(v′) , by the mean value theorem, there must exist
some v′′ ∈ (v′, v] such that Q˜i(v′′) < Qi(v′′) and Q˜′i(v′′) < Q′i(v′′) (and both Q˜i and Qi are
continuous at v′′). It follows that X ′i(v) = Q˜i(v)−Qi(v) < 0 for all v ∈ (v′′− , v′′ + ), for
some  > 0. Since Q˜′(v′′) ≥ 0, Q′i(v′′) > 0, so v′′ ∈ V−i . But this means that X ′i(v) = 0 for
a.e. v ∈ [v′′, v′′ + ) or for a.e. v ∈ (v′′ − , v′′] for some  > 0, which is a contradiction.






means that Q˜i(v) = Qi(v) for a.e. v ∈ Vi for each i ∈ N . We thus conclude that for any
feasible weak-cartel manipulation, M˜A = (q˜, t˜)
U M˜Ai (vi)− UMAi (vi) =
∫ vi
ri
(Q˜i(s)−Qi(s))ds = 0,∀vi,∀i. (19)
That is, auction rule A is unsusceptible to weak cartel.
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Appendix Appendix B:. Proofs for Section 4
Here we provide the proofs of Theorem 3 and 4. First, we establish a preliminary result
in Lemma 2 below. Fix a profile of reserve prices r = (ri)i∈N and define
P :=
{
p = (p1, · · · , pn) ∈ [0, 1]n
∣∣∣∑
i∈S
pi(1− Fi(ri)) ≤ 1−
∏
i∈S Fi(ri),∀S ⊂ N
}
. (20)
Note that the inequalities that define P correspond to the constraint (B) associated with
the constant interim allocation rule: Qi(vi) = pi ∈ [0, 1] if vi ≥ ri and Qi(vi) = 0 otherwise.
So, P is the set of all such allocation rules that are implementable (in the sense of being
a reduced form). Clearly, P is a convex polytope since the inequalities defining (20) are
all linear. The following lemma, whose proof is provided in the Supplementary Appendix,
gives a characterization for extreme points of P .
Lemma 2. A vector p = (p1, · · · , pN) ∈ [0, 1]N is an extreme point of P defined in (20) if





with pi = 1 for i = pi
−1(1). Moreover, at each extreme point, there are exactly n sets,
S1 ( · · · ( Sn = N , for which the weak inequalities in (20) are satisfied as equality.
Proof of Theorem 3: First, we relax some of the constraints and consider a relaxed
problem. To that end, define for any v ∈ [v∗, v]






The function Y (v) represents the probability that the object is not assigned to a bidder
whose value is at least v, even though there exists at least one such bidder. In other words,
Y (v) is the capacity that is not exhausted by the types above v. By some abuse of notation,
we define ri = inf{vi ∈ Vi|Qi(vi) > 0}.20 Define also N∗ := {i ∈ N |ri < v∗}. Given the
function Y and any subset M ⊂ N∗, the constraint (B) at a value profile v = (v1, · · · , vn)
with vi = ri for i ∈M and vi = v∗ for i ∈ N\M , can be written as























Since the weak collusion-proofness requires that Qi(·) is constant in the interval [ri, v∗), we
define pi = Qi(v) for v ∈ [ri, v∗). (Note that pi = 0 in case ri ≥ v∗.) Then, the relaxed



















∗)− F (ri)] ≤ Y (v∗) + F (v∗)n − F (v∗)n−|M |
∏
i∈M
F (ri),∀M ⊂ N∗. (25)
Note first that the objective function is rewritten by embedding the collusion-proofness
constraint (CP ), so the constraint (CP ) is dropped. To compare the other constraints of
[P ′] to those of [P ], the monotonicity constraint (M) is dropped in [P ′]. Also, the capacity
constraints (B) is imposed on a much smaller set of value profiles: The inequality in (24)
corresponds to the capacity constraint (B) along the diagonal where vi = v ∈ [v∗, v],∀i ∈ N ;
In light of (23), the inequality (25) corresponds to the capacity constraint at the profile v
where vi = ri if i ∈ M and vi = v∗ otherwise. We aim to obtain a solution of [P ′], which
will turn out to satisfy all the constraints of [P ] and thus solve [P ] as well.
Our search for a solution of [P ′] consists of three lemmas, Lemma 3 to 5. The first
lemma shows that at the optimum, bidders who have negative virtual value must have a
zero probability of obtaining the object in equilibrium. It also provides an upper bound,
equal to v∗, to a set of values that can be assigned zero probability at the optimum. The
proof of this result is provided in the Supplementary Appendix.
Lemma 3. At any optimum of [P ′], it must be that ri ≥ vˆ for all i ∈ N . Also, it is without
loss to assume that ri < v
∗,∀i ∈ N (i.e. N∗ = N) at an optimal solution of [P ′].
The next Lemma shows that the constraint (B) must be binding at all profile (v, . . . , v)
for each v ≥ v∗.
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Qi(s)f(s)ds = 1− F (v)n,∀v ∈ [v∗, v] (26)
Proof. To solve [P ′], let us fix r for a while at any level satisfying r < (v∗, · · · , v∗). Given
Y (v∗), the second term of the objective function in [P ′] can be independently maximized









subject to (25). Let φ(y; r) denote the value function obtained from solving [R; y].




Proof. To prove the concavity of φ, consider any y and y′, and let p and p′ denote the
solution of [R; y] and [R; y′], respectively. Since the constraint (25) is linear in y and p, for
any λ ∈ [0, 1], we have λp+ (1− λ)p′ satisfying the constraint of [R;λy+ (1− λ)y′]. Given
this and the linearity of the objective function in p, we must have φ(λy + (1 − λ)y′; r) ≥
λφ(y; r) + (1− λ)φ(y′; r), as desired.
To prove ∂φ(0;r)
∂y






























G(ri),∀M ∈ 2N . (28)
Set up the Lagrangian for this problem as





































F (v∗)n < J(v
∗).





F (v∗)n ≥ J(v∗). To draw a contradiction, we investi-
gate the program [R; 0]. First of all, since the objective and constraints are all linear in
(q1, · · · , qn), the optimum arises at one of vertices of the constraint set, which is a polytope
given by the inequalities in (28). Denote that vertex by q0. Note next that the constraints
in (28) are identical to those in (20) with F and pi being replaced by G and qi, respectively.
So, according to Lemma 2, at the vertex q0, there are exactly n subsets of N , M1, · · · ,Mn,
for which (28) holds as equality, and some j ∈ N for whom j ∈ Mk, ∀k = 1, · · · , n. Also,
letting M := {M1, · · · ,Mn}, (28) holds as strict inequality for all M ∈ 2N\M, which








M . Given this and
































which implies that q0j = 0. This cannot happen, however, due to the fact that the (28)
holds as equality for M = {j} since {j} ∈ M.
We now show that at the optimum, Y (v) = 0 for all v ≥ v∗. Suppose that r = (r1, · · · , rn)
is fixed at the optimal level. Then, the interim allocation rule Q that solves [P ′] can be







J(v)Qi(v)f(v)dv + φ(Y (v
∗); r)
subject to (24). Consider this as an optimal control problem with control variable Q(·),
state variable Y (·), and salvage value φ(Y (v∗); r). Note that







Letting γ and λ denote the costate variable and the multiplier for (24), one can write the
Hamiltonian (or Lagrangian) for [P ′′] (exclusive of the salvage value) as









Since both objective and constraint functions are concave (in particular, φ(·; r) is concave
by Lemma 3), the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimum is given as follows21:
∂H
∂Qi




Y (v∗) ≥ 0, γ(v∗) + ∂φ(Y (v
∗); r)
∂y






Y (v), λ(v) ≥ 0 and Y (v)λ(v) = 0, (32)
where γ(v∗) is the derivative of the value function (exclusive of the salvage value) for [P ′′].
From (29), J(v) = −γ(v) and thus using (30), we obtain λ(v) = −γ′(v) = J ′(v) > 0, which
implies by (32) that Y (v) = 0,∀v ∈ [v∗, v]. One can now verify (31) since Y (v∗) = 0 and
∂φ(0;r)
∂y
< J(v∗) = −γ(v∗) by Lemma 3.
Since the optimality condition (26) does not pin down an interim allocation rule for each
individual bidder, let us set
Qi(v) = F (v)
n−1,∀v ∈ (v∗, v],∀i ∈ N. (33)
This allocation rule along with p = (p1, · · · , pn) defined in Lemma 5 below will satisfy the
monotonicity constraint.22
The last lemma shows how to determine the reserve prices (r1, . . . , rn) and interim win-
ning probabilities (p1, . . . , pn) for the types between ri and v
∗.
Lemma 5. At an optimum of [P ′], r = (r1, · · · , rn) is chosen (up to a permutation among
symmetric bidders) as











21Refer to Leonard and Van Long (1992) or Kamien and Shwartz (1991), for instance.
22In fact, one can show that any interim rule satisfying (M), (B), and (26) must take the form given in
(33).
WEAL CARTELS 37
Then, p = (p1, · · · , pn) is given as





Moreover, the profile r = (r1, · · · , rn) in (34) satisfies vˆ = rn < rn−1 < · · · < r1 < v∗.
Proof. By Lemma 4, whatever r is chosen, we must have Y (v∗) = 0 at the optimum. Thus,
in order for (p, r) to solve [P ′], the pair (q, r) (where qi =
pi
F (v∗)n−1 ) must solve the problem
in (27) with y = 0 and r being included as choice variable. As mentioned in the proof
of Claim 3, the optimum of that problem arises at one of the vertices in the constraint








pi = F (v




Plugging this into (27) yields the objective function in (34), which can then be maximized
by choosing r˜ optimally. Plugging the optimal r˜ into (36) yields (35).










J(v)f(v)dv + F (r˜i)Π˜i+1, i = 1, · · · , n− 1.
One can easily verify that the objective function in (34) is the same as the function Π˜1
defined above. Also, the terms in the objective function that involve r˜i are all included
in Π˜i (multiplied by some expression unrelated to r˜i.). Thus, maximizing the objective
function corresponds to choosing r˜i for each i ∈ N that maximizes Π˜i, given the maximized
value of Π˜i+1. Let us recursively define ri and Πi to be respectively the maximizer and
maximized value of Π˜i with Πi+1 given. From (37), it is immediate that rn = vˆ.
In order to complete the proof, we adopt the induction argument to show the followings:
For all i = 1, · · · , n − 1, (i) Πi+1 < F (v∗)n−iJ(v∗); (ii) ri+1 < ri < v∗. Consider i = n − 1
for the initial step. Then, Πn =
∫ v∗
vˆ
J(s)f(s)ds < F (v∗)J(v∗) so (i) is satisfied. For (ii),
note that ∂Π˜n−1(r˜n−1,Πn)
∂r˜n−1
= f(r˜n−1)[Πn − F (v∗)J(r˜n−1)], which is negative if r˜n−1 = v∗ and
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positive if r˜n−1 = vˆ = rn. So we must have rn < rn−1 < v∗. Let us now assume that (i)
and (ii) hold for some k > 1, that is Πk+1 < F (v
∗)n−kJ(v∗) and rk+1 < rk < v∗. We show
that Πk < F (v
∗)n−k+1J(v∗) and rk < rk−1 < v∗. First, the fact that Πk < F (v∗)n−k+1J(v∗)
follows from












where the first inequality is due to the inductive assumption and the second inequality
holds since v∗ > rk and J(v∗) > J(v),∀v < v∗. To show rk−1 < v∗, note that by (38),
∂Π˜k−1(v∗,Πk)
∂r˜k−1
= f(v∗)[Πk − F (v∗)n−k+1J(v∗)] < 0, which implies rk−1 < v∗. To show lastly
that rk < rk−1, notice that the first-order conditions w.r.t. rk and rk−1 yield J(rk) =
Πk+1
F (v∗)n−k and J(rk−1) =
Πk




F (v∗)n−k+1 or F (v
∗)Πk+1 < Πk, which is true since Πk = Π˜k(rk,Πk+1) > Π˜k(v∗,Πk+1) =
F (v∗)Πk+1.
Combining (33), (34), and (35) gives a solution to the problem [P ′]. It remains to check
that it satisfies (M) and (B) and thus solves [P ] as well. It is straightforward to check that
(M) is satisfied. To show that (B) is satisfied, it suffices to construct an ex-post allocation
rule that generates the interim rule in (33) and (35):
qi(v) =

1 if either vi > max{v∗,maxj 6=i vj}
or vi ∈ [ri, v∗),maxj 6=i vj < v∗, and vj < rj,∀j < i
0 otherwise
. (39)
It is straightforward to check that q specified above generates the desired interim rule.
Proof of Theorem 4: Given the interim winning probability profile p = (p1, · · · , pn),
the capacity constraint (B) is the same as requiring p ∈ P defined in (20). Then, p can be
expressed as a convex combination of extreme points of P given in (21): letting Π denote
the set of all permutation functions, and for each pi ∈ Π, letting ppii :=
∏
j:pi(j)<pi(i) Fi(ri)



































as desired, where the second equality follows since the objective function is linear with
respect to the weighting vector (λpi)pi∈Π so the entire weight can be be assigned to a function
pi that maximizes the term in the square bracket.
Next, we show that ri ≥ rj if pi(i) < pi(j). Suppose to the contrary that it is not true.
Then, there must be some i, j ∈ N such that pi(i) = pi(j)− 1 (i.e. i immediately precedes
j) and ri < rj. Consider now an alternative mechanism (r
′, pi′) which is the same as (r, pi),
except that the orders of i and j are reversed: i.e. pi′(i) = pi(j) and pi′(j) = pi(i) while
pi′(k) = pi(k),∀k 6= i, j and r′k = rk, ∀k ∈ N . Note that this does not affect the revenue
from other bidders than i and j, while the revenue from i and j changes from(
Πk:pi(k)<pi(i)Fk(rk)
) [





(1− Fj(rj))rj + Fj(rj)(1− Fi(ri))ri
]
.
Subtracting the former from the latter and rearranging yield(
Πk:pi(k)<pi(i)Fk(rk)
)
(1− Fi(ri))(1− Fj(rj))(rj − ri) > 0,
so the revenue is higher with the alternative mechanism, a contradiction.
Appendix Appendix C:. Proofs for Section 5
In this section it will be sufficient to focus on the case in which the seller offers a direct
mechanism M . Let M˜ = (q˜, t˜) denote an equilibrium outcome that results from a cartel
game following M . Since M˜ is an equilibrium outcome, it must be incentive compatible.
We next show that there is a lower bound for the payoff that each bidder enjoys in that
equilibrium, assuming that all bidders play cartel-undominated strategies (on and off the
equilibrium path).
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To this end, fix any bidder i, and let pii = {C1, . . . , Ck} denote an arbitrary partition
of N\{i}, with the interpretation that each group C`, ` = 1, . . . , k, forms a cartel, in case
bidder i chooses not to join any cartel. Let Πi denote the set of all such partitions. Finally,
let Ω(vC) be the set of cartel-undominated strategies at vC .
Lemma 6. In any equilibrium outcome M˜ , the interim payoff of each bidder i with value













C1 , . . . , v
′
Ck |vi)
∣∣∣v′C` ∈ Ω(vC`),∀C` ∈ pii, and pii ∈ Πi}].
Proof. For any type profile (vi, v−i) and bidder i’s report v′i, define
uMi (v
′






C1 , . . . , v
′
Ck |vi)
∣∣∣v′C` ∈ Ω(vC`), ∀C` ∈ pii, and pii ∈ Πi} .
Let µi(hi) ∈ ∆(V−i) denote the bidder i’s updated belief (under Bayes’ rule) at the end
of the cartel game following M , given that he has observed a (private) history hi. Let
Hi denote the set of all history that bidder i can observe with a positive probability at
equilibrium. For each hi ∈ Hi, let τi(hi) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with which hi arises
at equilibrium. We now classify Hi into two categories depending on whether or not bidder
i is a member of a cartel, and argue that after any history hi ∈ Hi, the expected payoff of








Note first that this is the lowest payoff bidder i can get when he is not a member of any
cartel, given that all cartels employ cartel-undominated strategies and bidder i with belief
µi(hi) optimally responds to that. Clearly, his equilibrium payoff after history hi where he
did not join any cartel, cannot fall below (40). The same is true after history hi where he
joins some cartel, since his payoff from deviating to reject all cartel proposals is at least
(40) so the payoff from having accepted some proposal cannot fall below (40). Thus, bidder
















Ev−i [uMi (v′i|vi, v−i)] = U
M
i (vi),
where the first equality follows from the fact that Eτi [Eµi(hi)[·]] = Ev−i [·] and the second




In order to prove Theorem 5, we introduce a couple of general properties and show in
Theorem 6 that they are sufficient for a WCP mechanism to be robustly collusion-proof.
Definition 5. A direct auction mechanism M = (q, t) is mDSIC if (i) qi is nondecreasing
in vi and nonincreasing in v−i, and (ii)




Note that this property is slightly stronger than the usual dominant-strategy incentive
compatibility since it requires qi to be non-increasing with v−i. To state the second property,
given a direct mechanism M = (q, t), let uMi (v|vi) = viqi(v) − ti(v) for any vi ∈ Vi and
v ∈ V . Also, for any S ⊂ N , let VS = ×i∈SVi.
Definition 6. A direct auction mechanism M = (q, t) is weakly non-bossy if the fol-
lowing holds for any C ( N and almost every vC ∈ VC: for any two strategy profiles v′C
and v′′C ≤ v′C ∈ VC satisfying uMi (v′C , vN\C |vi) = uMi (v′′C , vN\C |vi),∀i ∈ C, ∀vN\C ∈ VN\C , we
must have uMi (v
′
C , vN\C |vi) = uMi (v′′C , vN\C |vi),∀i ∈ N\C, ∀vN\C ∈ VN\C .
The weak non-bossiness requires no group of bidders to affect others’ payoffs without
changing their own payoffs. Note that this requirement is very weak since it only applies
to two strategy profiles, v′C and v
′′
C , that satisfy v
′
C ≥ v′′C and also yield the same payoffs for
bidders in C irrespective of strategies, vN\C , played by bidders outside C. All commonly
known auction mechanisms are weakly non-bossy.
Theorem 6. If a direct auction mechanism M = (q, t) is mDSIC, weakly non-bossy, and
WCP, then it is robustly collusion-proof.
Proof. Let us first make a couple observation from the fact that M is mDSIC. First, given
(41), M is dominant-strategy incentive compatible. Second, if bidder i with value vi reports
truthfully, and others report any arbitrary v−i, then he earns




which means that his payoff is decreasing in v−i since qi is decreasing in v−i.
Now fix any coalition C of bidders and its value profile vC . Consider any strategy profile
of that coalition v′C . Letting v
′′
C = vC ∧ v′C , i.e. v′′i = min{v′i, vi},∀i ∈ C, we show that
uMi (v
′
C , vN\C |vi) ≤ uMi (v′′C , vN\C |vi),∀vN\C ,∀i ∈ C. (42)
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To do so, change the strategy of any bidder j ∈ C from v′j to v′′j and observe that
uMi (v
′
C , vN\C |vi) ≤ uMi (v′′j , v′C\{j}, vN\C |vi),∀vN\C ,∀i ∈ C, (43)
since the dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of M for bidder j means that
uMj (v
′
C , vN\C |vj) ≤ uMj (v′′j , v′C\{j}, vN\C |vj),∀vN\C ,
and since, for i ∈ C \ {j}, the mDSIC property with v′′j ≤ v′j implies that:
uMi (v
′
C , vN\C |vi) ≤ uMi (v′′j , v′C\{j}, vN\C |vi), ∀vN\C .
Now start from the strategy profile (v′′j , v
′
C\{j}) and change the strategy of another bidder
j′ ∈ C\{j} from v′j′ to v′′j′ , which (weakly) increases the payoffs of bidders in C in a way
analogous to (43). The inequality (42) will then follow from repeating the same argument
one by one for all bidders in C.
According to the above argument so far, we can have v′C being C-undominated by v
′′
C–
namely v′C ∈ Ω(vC)–only if (42) holds as equality. Then, the weak non-bossiness requires
that for almost every vC , any bidder outside C must also be indifferent between (v
′
C , vN\C)





C , vN\C |vi) = uMi (v′′C , vN\C |vi) ≥ vMi (vC , vN\C |vi), ∀i ∈ N\C, ∀vN\C , (44)
where the inequality follows from v′′C = vC ∧ v′C ≤ vC .
Now fix any bidder i ∈ N and consider pii = {C1, ..., Ck} ∈ Πi. Repeatedly applying
(44) from cartel C1 to Ck, one can obtain that for any vi and almost every v−i ∈ V−i,
uMi (vi, v
′
C1 , ..., v
′




i (vi) ≥ Ev−i [uMi (vi, v−i|vi)] = UMi (vi). (45)
Consider now any mechanism M˜ that satisfies (IC) and (RC − IR). Combining (RC −
IR) and (45), we obtain U M˜i (vi) ≥ UMi (vi) ≥ UMi (vi),∀vi,∀i. The inequality here must
hold as equality due to the weak collusion-proofness of M , which in turn implies (by the
standard revenue equivalence argument) that Qi(vi) = Q˜i(vi) and Ti(vi) = T˜i(vi) for all
i ∈ N and almost every vi ∈ Vi.
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We now prove Theorem 5 using Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 5: Let us begin by observing that the ex-post allocation rule given
in (39) satisfies Part (i) of mDSIC property. Using this allocation rule and (41), we obtain
ti(v) =

maxj 6=i vj if vi ≥ maxj 6=i vj ≥ v∗
v∗ if vi ≥ v∗ > maxj 6=i vj and vj ≥ rj for some j < i
ri if vi ≥ ri, v∗ > maxj 6=i vj, and vj < rj,∀j < i
0 otherwise
. (46)
We now claim that the mechanism M = (q, t) specified in (39) and (46) is RCP. By Theorem
6, it suffices to show that M is weakly non-bossy.
To do so, consider any set of bidders C ( N and a value profile vC such that vi 6=
vj, ∀i, j ∈ C and vi 6= ri,∀i ∈ C.23 Suppose that there are two strategy profiles v′C and
v′′C ≤ v′C satisfying
uMi (v
′
C , vN\C |vi) = uMi (v′′C , vN\C |vi),∀i ∈ C, ∀vN\C . (47)
We aim to show that
uMi (v
′
C , vN\C |vi) = uMi (v′′C , vN\C |vi),∀i ∈ N\C, ∀vN\C . (48)
Let v′C,k and v
′′





Let also vN\C,k denote the k-th highest value from vN\C . Define m′ = #{i ∈ C|v′i = v′C,1}.
We first consider the case where v′C,1 ≥ v∗, and show that (47) holds only in case v′C,1 =
v′′C,1, which will imply (48) since only the highest report from C can affect the payoffs of
bidders outside C, given the mechanism M . Suppose for a contradiction that v′′C,1 < v
′
C,1.
(Note that v′′C,1 ≤ v′C,1 since v′′C ≤ v′C by assumption.) We focus on the case v′′C,1 ≥ v∗
since the argument in case v′′C,1 < v
∗ is relatively straightforward. For any vN\C with
vN\C,1 ∈ (v′′C,1, v′C,1), all bidders in C obtain zero payoff with the strategy profile (v′′C , vN\C),
which must also be true with (v′C , vN\C) in order for (47) to hold. Let bidder i ∈ C be such
that v′i = v
′
C,1. Suppose first m
′ = 1 and choose vN\C such that vN\C,1 ∈ (v′C,2, v′C,1). Then,
bidder i’s payoff with the profile (v′C , vN\C) would be (vi − vN\C,1), which cannot be zero
if we choose vN\C,1 6= vi, contradicting (47). Suppose alternatively m′ > 1 and so there is
another bidder j ∈ C such that v′j = v′C,1. In order that bidder i obtains zero payoff with
23Note that it suffices to consider almost every value profile to check the weak non-bossiness.
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any profile (v′C , vN\C) satisfying vN\C,1 < v
′
C,1, we must have vi = v
′
C,1, which implies that
bidder j’s payoff is 1
m′ (vj − v′C,1) 6= 0 since vj 6= vi, contradicting (47).
Let us now consider the case where v′C,1 < v
∗. There are two cases to consider depending
on whether or not there is some bidder i ∈ C such that v′i ∈ [ri, v∗). The argument is
straightforward when there is no such bidder, and thus omitted. In case there is at least
one such bidder, let j = min{i ∈ C|v′i ∈ [ri, v∗)}. Then, (48) will clearly hold if j = n,
which is because, in that case, v′′i ≤ v′i < ri for all i ∈ C\{j}, v′′j ≤ v′j < v∗, and thus the
change from v′C to v
′′
C cannot affect the payoff of any k ∈ N\C. In case j < n, a change in
bidder j’s report from v′j to v
′′
j , given that v
′′
i ≤ v′i < ri for all i ∈ C preceding j, can affect
the payoffs of bidders outside C only when v′′j < rj ≤ v′j. In this case, however, if vi < ri
for all i ∈ N\C with i < j, bidder j earns (vj − rj) 6= 0 by reporting v′j while he earns zero
by reporting v′′j , which contradicts (47).
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Supplementary Appendix to
Weak Cartels and Collusion-Proof Auctions
Yeon-Koo Che, Daniele Condorelli, and Jinwoo Kim
Proof of Lemma 3: Let us denote by IT , the inequality (20) with S = T ⊂ N . We
first show that any p satisfying (21) is an extreme point of P . Note that the allocation
probability p can be achieved in a feasible way by assigning the k-th order to each agent
pi(k) and then allocating the object in this order as long as the agents have values no lower
than their reserve prices, which implies that p is a reduced form. Thus Lemma 1 implies
that p must satisfy (20) so p ∈ PN . Suppose for a contradiction that p is not an extreme
point of P . Then, we can write p = λp′ + (1 − λ)p′′ for some p′ 6= p and p′′ 6= p. Since




pi(1) ≤ 1 (by I{pi(1)}), we must have p′pi(1) = p′′pi(1) = 1. Using this and
applying I{pi(1),pi(2)} to p′ and p′′, we obtain p′pi(2), p
′′
pi(2) ≤ Fpi(1)(rpi(1)) = ppi(2), which implies
p′pi(2) = p
′′





j<k Fpi(j)(rpi(j)) = ppi(k) for all k ∈ N , a contradiction. To show that any
extreme point p ∈ P can be expressed as in (21) for some pi, we first establish the following
claim.
Claim 4. If for any two sets S, T ⊂ N , IS and IT hold as equality, then either S ⊂ T or
T ⊂ S.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that for some S, T ⊂ N , IS and IT hold as equality but
S * T and T * S. Then, we must have S ∩T ( T and S\T 6= ∅. To draw a contradiction,













For this, note that by IS∪T and the assumption,∑
i∈S∪T











It is straightforward to see that (S.1) results from subtracting (S.3) from (S.2) side by side.
Also, by IS∩T , we have ∑
i∈S∩T




Adding this inequality and (S.1) side by side yields∑
i∈T







































However, (S.4) contradicts the assumption that IT holds as equality.
Pick any extreme point p ∈ P satisfying (20). Let us denote by S1, · · · , Sm, all subsets of
N for which (20) is satisfied as equality given p. Due to the above Claim, these subsets
must have a nested structure, that is S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sm. Since N contains n elements,
m cannot be greater than n. Suppose for a contradiction that m < n. Then, there must
be some k and h, j ∈ N with h 6= j such that h, j /∈ S` if ` < k and h, j ∈ S` if ` ≥ k. We
now show that p can be obtained by linearly combining some p′ and p′′ ∈ P , contradicting
that p is an extreme point. To do so, we denote by ei, n-dimensional vector with its i-the
element being 1 and all others being zero. Let p′ = p − eh + δej and p′′ = p + eh − δej,
where  and δ are sufficiently small positive real numbers satisfying
(1− Fh(rh)) = δ(1− Fj(rj)),















and similarly for p′′. From this, we see that whether p satisfies (20) as equality or strict
inequality, the same is true for p′ and p′′, provided that  and δ are sufficiently small, which




p′′, resulting in the desired contradiction. Thus, we
must have m = n, which implies |Sk\Sk−1| = 1 for all k = 1, · · · , n with S0 = ∅.
WEAL CARTELS 3
To complete the proof, define the permutation function pi : N → N such that pi(i) = k if
{i} = Sk\Sk−1. Then, by definition of S1, IS1 holds as equality or pi(1−Fi(ri)) = 1−Fi(ri)




Fj(rj) for i = pi
−1(k′),∀k′ = 1, · · · , k − 1. (S.5)
Then, by definition of Sk and pi, we must have for i = pi
−1(k)∑
j:pi(j)≤pi(i)=k








Proof of Lemma 4: We let Q = (Q1, · · · , Qn) denote the optimum of [P ′]. First sup-
pose to the contrary that rj < vˆ for some j. Let us construct an alternative rule Q =
(Q1, · · · , Qn) as
Qi(vi) =
0 if i = j and vi < vˆQi(vi) otherwise.
Clearly, the value of objective function is higher with Q than with Q. Also, Q satisfies the
constraints (M) and (CP ). So it only remains to show that (B) is satisfied, for which it
suffices to construct an ex-post rule generating Q.24 To do so, let (q1, · · · , qn) denote the
ex-post allocation rule for Q and we can construct the ex-post rule for Q as
qi(v) =
0 if i = j and vj < vˆqi(v) otherwise.
To prove the second statement, we first show that any optimum must have ri ∈ [vˆ, v∗)
for at least one agent i. Suppose not, i.e. ri ≥ v∗,∀i ∈ N . We draw a contradiction by
constructing an alternative interim allocation rule Q˜ which makes the value of objective
function greater than Q does, and which differs from Q only in that for an arbitrarily chosen
agent k, Q˜k(vk) = p˜k = F (v
∗)n−1 for vk ∈ [vˆ, v∗]. It is clear that the value of objective
function is greater with Q˜ by as much as F (v∗)n−1
∫ v∗
vˆ
J(s)dF (s) > 0. Since Y (v) for all
v ≥ v∗ is unaffected by the change from Q to Q˜, it only remains to check (25). Letting
24Recall that the condition (B) is necessary and sufficient for there to be an ex-post allocation rule that
generates Q as an associated interim allocation rule.
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r˜i = inf{vi ∈ Vi|Q˜i(vi) > 0} and N˜∗ = {i ∈ N |r˜i < v∗}, we have N˜∗ = {k} so can focus on
M = {k}. Then, (25) can be written as
F (v∗)n−1[F (v∗)− F (vˆ)] ≤ Y (v∗) + F (v∗)n − F (v∗)n−1F (vˆ),
which clearly holds since Y (v∗) ≥ 0.
Given a solution Q of [P ′], the above argument means N∗ = {i ∈ N |ri < v∗} 6= ∅. Assuming
that N∗ 6= N , we construct an alternative solution Q˜ of [P ′] such that r˜i = inf{vi ∈
Vi|Q˜i(vi) > 0} < v∗, ∀i ∈ N . Letting N∗ = N\N∗, select any agent k ∈ N∗ and then define
Q˜ to be the same as Q, except that for each agent i ∈ N∗ ∪ {k}, Q˜i(vi) = p˜i = pk|N∗|+1 for
vi ∈ (rk, v∗), where pk = Qk(vk) > 0 for vk ∈ (rk, v∗). It is clear that the value of objective
function remains the same under Q˜. Since Y (v) for all v ≥ v∗ is unaffected, it only remains
to check (25). We can focus on such M that M ∩ (N∗ ∪ {k}) 6= ∅, since the allocation for
each agent i /∈ N∗ ∪ {k} has not been changed. For any such M , note that∑
i∈M
p˜i[F (v



































where the first inequality holds since Q satisfies (25) and the second due to the facts that
M ∩ (N∗ ∪ {k}) 6= ∅ implies |(M ∩ N∗) ∪ {k}| ≤ |M | and that r˜i ≤ min{ri, v∗},∀i ∈ N .
Combining (S.6) and (S.7), we obtain∑
i∈M
p˜i[F (v






so Q˜ satisfies (25).
